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 State v. Zunick1 presented the Montana Supreme Court with a 
question of first impression: what constitutes a proper colloquy under 
Montana Code Annotated § 46–12–211(4), and when must the colloquy 
occur?2 This statute governs the process of when a district court judge 
refuses to accept the terms of a plea agreement following the entry of a 
guilty plea.3 Specifically at issue in this case is the statute’s r quirement 
that the court allow the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty 
plea following a deviation from the agreed-upon sentence.4 
This note first examines how a defendant could historically 
withdraw a plea of guilty under Montana Code Annotated § 46–16–
105(2). Then, following an examination of the factual and procedural 
history in Zunick, this note analyzes how these two statutes may stand in 
relation to each other. However, because the Court in Zunick never 
addressed § 46–16–105(2), we are ultimately left in the dark as to the 
true understanding of how these two statutes are connected, if at all. 
 
II.  HISTORY 
 
 Traditionally, a district court may permit the withdrawal of a 
guilty plea upon a showing of good cause.5 The Court has noted that 
“good cause” includes the minimal constitutional requirement that a 
guilty plea be made intelligently and voluntarily.6 Montana uses the 
Supreme Court’s voluntariness standard laid out in Brady v. United 
States:7  
 
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the 
direct consequences, including the actual value of any 
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or 
his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats 
(or promises to discontinue improper harassment), 
misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable 
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their 
                                         
1 State v. Zunick, ___ P.3d ___, 2014 WL 4432601 (Mont. 2014). 
2 Id. at *3. 
3 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–12–211(4) (2013). 
4 Id. 
5 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–16–105(2). 
6 State v. Deserly, 188 P.3d 1057, 1060 (Mont. 2008), overruled on different grounds by State v. 
Brinson, 210 P.3d 164 (Mont. 2009). 
7 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
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nature improper as having no proper relationship to the 
prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).8 
 
However, involuntariness alone is not enough to satisfy he good cause 
requirement: “Involuntariness and discovery of new exculpatory 
evidence constitute good cause for withdrawal of a plea . . . but others 
may exist.”9 Section 46–16–105(2) also allows good cause if there is “a 
claim of innocence . . . supported by evidence of a undamental 
miscarriage of justice.”10  
 
III.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 On February 14, 2012, Missoula County sheriffs found Zunick 
and his car in a ditch.11 The officers observed that he was visibly 
intoxicated and arrested him.12 Zunick admitted to being drunk, and back 
at the detention center his blood alcohol was measur d at 0.202.13 Zunick 
was charged with criminal endangerment and aggravated driving under 
the influence.14 
 On March 13, 2012, Zunick pleaded not guilty to both counts.15 
On June 19, 2012, and with advisement of counsel, Zunick made a plea 
agreement with the State pursuant to § 46–12–211(1)(b).16 The State 
agreed to seek a sentence of six years, with three years suspended, for the 
criminal endangerment and one year suspended for the DUI.17 At the 
change of plea hearing, the district court informed Zunick that the court 
was not bound by the terms of the agreement, but if the court chose not 
to follow the sentencing recommendations, Zunick would be afforded the 
chance to withdraw his plea(s) of guilty.18  
On September 4, 2012, the district court sentenced Zunick to ten 
years suspended with the conditions laid out in the plea agreement.19 The 
court explained its reasoning for not imposing the recommended 
sentence: a longer sentence with no actual incarceration better suits 
Zunick because he is raising a seven-year old daughter.20 The court then 
asked Zunick if he had any questions about the conditi s and if he 
agreed with the sentence.21 Zunick stated that he understood and agreed 
                                         
8 Deserly, 188 P.3d at 1060 (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 755). 
9 Id. (emphasis added). 
10 Id. 






17 Zunick at *1. 
18 Id. at *3. 
19 Id. at *1. 
20 Id. at *3. 
21 Id. at *1. 
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with the sentence.22 The court did not explicitly tell Zunick it was 
rejecting the plea agreement nor did the court allow him an opportunity 
to withdraw his plea.23 
On March 26, 2013, Zunick violated a condition of his 
suspended sentence when he drove without permission from his 
probation officer.24 On May 24, 2013, Zunick moved the district court to 
change this condition; the court denied the motion on June 18, 2013.25 
On September 17, 2013, Zunick moved to withdraw his guilty plea, 
alleging that the court failed to comply with § 46–12 211(4).26 Upon 
rejecting a (1)(b) plea agreement, this statute requi s the court to: (1) 
inform the parties it is rejecting the agreement; (2) advise the defendant 
that the court is not bound by the agreement; (3) afford the defendant the 
opportunity to withdraw his plea; and (4) advise thdefendant that the 
disposition of the case may be less favorable than t contemplated in 
the agreement.27 On October 28, 2013, the court denied Zunick’s motion 
to withdraw his plea; Zunick appealed from that decision.28 
 
IV.  MAJORITY OPINION 
 
 In a 4–1 decision, the Court held the full advisory p ovisions of 
§ 46–12–211(4) must be expressly given by the judge wh n the plea 
agreement is rejected.29 A district court cannot, as it did in Zunick’s case, 
give the advisory warnings in a piecemeal fashion during multiple 
hearings.30 To reach this decision, the Court relied upon a principle of 
statutory construction contained in Montana Code Annotated § 1–2–101, 
which states that where a statute has several particul rs, the judge should 
adopt a construction that gives meaning to all.31 The statute at issue in 
this case reads “[i]f the court rejects a plea agreem nt . . . the court shall, 
on the record [provide the four advisories].”32 The Court stated that the 
only reasonable statutory interpretation requires these advisories to be 
given at the time the plea agreement is actually reject d; advisories given 
before this time do not satisfy the statute.33 Because the district court did 
not give the full advisories at the time it rejected he plea agreement, the 
district court’s ruling was reversed.34 Zunick’s sentence was vacated and 
                                         
22 Id. 
23 Zunick at *3. 
24 Id. at *4 (McGrath, J., dissenting). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–12–411(4). 
28 Zunick at *2. 
29 Id. at *4. 
30 Id. at *3. 
31 Id. 
32 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–12–211(4). 
33 Zunick at *3. 
34 Id. at *4. 
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the trial judge was instructed to conduct another sentencing hearing.35 
The court may again either accept or reject the agrement; if it rejects the 
agreement, it must give the full advisory and allow Zunick an 
opportunity to withdraw his plea.36 If the court accepts the agreement, 
then it must impose the sentence in that agreement.37 
 
V. MCGRATH’S DISSENT 
 
 The lone dissenter, Justice McGrath, took a more traditional 
view of guilty plea withdrawal. He argued Zunick not only understood 
the terms of his sentence, but he explicitly agreed with its terms at the 
sentencing hearing.38 Additionally, Zunick did not make the necessary 
good cause showing required to withdraw a plea of guilty, “[h]e simply 
found the conditions advantageous, until he didn’t.”39 McGrath 
essentially argued, as the district court did, that we should give 
precedence to substance over form regarding the sent nci g hearing.40 
 
VI.  ANALYSIS 
 
  In Zunick, the Court never mentioned the necessary good cause 
showing under § 46–16–105(2), despite the fact both parties addressed 
this statute in their briefs.41 The facts make it clear that Zunick 
voluntarily entered his plea of guilty under the Brady test, making a 
traditional good cause showing difficult at best.42 Instead, the Court 
relied solely on § 46–12–211(4) to reach its decision.43 The question thus 
becomes, how do these two statutes relate to one another?  
One possibility is that a district court’s failure to give the full 
advisories pursuant to § 46–12–211(4) constitutes good cause for the 
purposes of § 46–16–105(2). In fact, the Court suggested just that in 
State v. Lone Elk:44 “fair and just reasons for withdrawal of guilty plea 
include an inadequate colloquy.”45 However, an improper colloquy was 
not the issue in Lone Elk; the statement that an unsatisfactory colloquy is 
good cause under § 46–16–105(2) was mere dicta.46  
                                         
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Zunick at *4 
38 Id. at *4 (McGrath, J., dissenting). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at *2 (majority). 
41 Appellant’s Opening Br., State v. Zunick, 2014 WL 832813 at *5 (Mont. Feb. 18, 2014) (No. DA
13-0812); Appellee’s Br., State v. Zunick, 2014 WL 2198009 at *5 (Mont. May 14, 2014) (No. DA 
13-0812). 
42 Zunick at *1. 
43 Id. at *4. 
44 State v. Lone Elk, 108 P.3d 500 (Mont. 2005). 
45 Id. at 505 (citing United States v. Turner, 898 F.2d 705, 713 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
46 Id. 
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The second possibility, and the more plausible one, is that the 
relation between the two statutes is nearly nonexist nt. Justice McGrath’s 
dissent does not mention § 46–16–105(2).47 Yet he does argue that 
despite an inadequate colloquy under § 46–12–211(4), Zunick should not 
have been granted relief.48 Surely if an inadequate colloquy is good cause 
then Justice McGrath could not make this argument. The majority also 
fails to address good cause, even though it would make their argument 
even stronger: the district court failed to provide a proper colloquy, 
therefore Zunick had good cause to withdraw his plea. Both the majority 
and the dissenting opinions strongly suggest that an in dequate colloquy 
pursuant to § 46–12–211(4) does not constitute good cause under § 46–
16–105(2).49 Nonetheless, because the issue was not discussed in Zunick, 
we are unfortunately left to wonder how the Court views the relationship 
between the two statutes. 
 The Court’s decision also has unfortunate implications for Mr. 
Zunick. If the Court ruled an inadequate colloquy is good cause to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, then it could have granted Zunick’s motion to 
withdraw his plea, and he would presumably go to trial. Yet because the 
case was ruled entirely under § 46–12–211(4), the remedy sidesteps 
Zunick’s request to withdraw his guilty plea and essentially rewinds the 
trial process to the point where the error was made: th  sentencing 
hearing.50 Thus, even though Zunick “won” the case, the Court did not 
grant his motion (the denial of which being the basis of his appeal).51 The 
overturned district court may now impose the original plea agreement 
sentence, which includes three years of incarceration.52 If the court does 
impose this sentence, Zunick will not be able to withdraw his plea unless 
he can show good cause, which is fairly unlikely given the current 
analysis. To be fair, Zunick never specifically argued that an inadequate 
colloquy constitutes good cause under § 46–15–105(2). Perhaps if he did, 
the Court could have taken on the issue, and Zunick could have been 
granted the relief he was actually seeking. 
 
                                         
47 Zunick at *4 (McGrath, J., dissenting). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at **3–4 (majority). 
50 Id. at *4. 
51 Id. 
52 Zunick at *4. 
